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NOTE
The Implications of Upjohn
The legal profession has given a confessional-like reverence, to the confiden-
tiality that exists between a lawyer and his client. Although the attorney-client
privilege cannot quantifiably be proven to have a beneficial effect, 2 it has existed
since the time of Elizabeth I.3 Commentators from Blackstone 4 to modern tax
attorneys5 have written of the necessity of the privilege, but no aspect of the
privilege has provoked more concern than its application in the corporate set-
ting.
6
The United States courts of appeals have developed three separate tests for
determining whether the privilege applies in the corporate setting,7 but in its first
hearing on the subject in more than a decade,8 the Supreme Court of the United
States in Upjohn Co. v. United Slates9 determined that the majority's "control
group" test was not the appropriate test.' 0 In addition, the Court decided that
the attorney work-product doctrine could be used in actions to enforce an Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) summons. " I The Court left untouched two significant
questions. It did not decide which test should be applied to determine if the
I Steinhaus, Privileged Communication in Tax Practice.: How It Began, Where It Stands, 15 TUL. TAX. INST.
530, 530 (1965).
2 See Kobak, The Uneven Application ofthe Attorney-Client Privilege to Corporations in the Federal Courts, 6
GA. L. REV. 339 (1972); Weissenberger, Toward Precision in the Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege for
Corporations, 65 IOWA L. REV. 899 (1980).
3 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2290, at 542 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIG-
MORE]; 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HIsTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 201 (1926).
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 683 (Gavit ed. 1941). English philosopherJeremy Bentham was
among those who refused to see the benefit of the attorney-client privilege. See J. BENTHAM, A TREATISE
ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 246-47 (J. Dumont ed. 1825).
5 Bender, A Review of Privileged Communications as Applied to Tax Fraud Proceedings, 23 TUL. TAX INST.
237 (1974); Steinhuas, supra note 1.
6 Selected Materials on Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege, 35 THE RECORD 360-63 (1980) (bibliography).
See Brodsky, The 'Tone of Darkness" Special Counsel Investigations and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 SEC. REG.
LJ. 123 (1980); Note, The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege.: Culpable Employees, Attorney Ethics, and the Joint
Defense Doctrine, 58 TEx. L. REv. 809 (1980); Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege-Identz) ing the Corporate
Client, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1980); Comment, The Privileged Few: United States v. Upjohn-Whats
the Scope ofthe Attorney-Client Privilege for a Corporation?, 25 S.D. L. REV. 415 (1980).
7 City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandams andprohibi-
lion deniedsub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cerl. denied, 372 U.S. 943
(1963) (the privilege applies only to those employees within the "control group" of the corporation);
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir.), aj'd by an equaly divided court , 400 U.S.
348 (197 1) (communication of an employee to a corporate attorney is protected if the communication is
made at the direction of a corporate superior and if the subject matter of the communication is within the
scope of the employee's work); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane)
(privilege applies if the subject matter test is met and if the communications are made to secure legal
advice and the contents of the communication remain confidential).
8 When the Supreme Court decided Upjohn Co. v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 677 (1981), in January
1981, more than a decade had passed since the Court announced its affirmation of Harper &Row. The
Court split four-to-four in Harper &Row in considering the "subject matter" test.
9 101 S. Ct. at 677. The majority test rejected by the Court was the "control group" test established
in the City of Philadelphia case. See text accompanying notes 40-42 infra.
10 Id at 686.
11 Id
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corporate attorney-client privilege attached1 2 and also left undecided the degree
of necessity the Government must demonstrate to overcome the work-product
doctrine when it is asserted in a tax summons enforcement proceeding. 13
Since Hickman v. Taylor,' 4 the attorney-client privilege and the attorney
work-product doctrine have been closely related. 15 This relationship is natural
since the attorney-client privilege protects the communications made between
lawyers and clients in the course of representation' 6 and the work-product doc-
trine protects the legal impressions, conclusions and strategies devised by lawyers
in anticipation of litigation.
1 7
Both doctrines were pleaded by the Upjohn Company (Upjohn), a pharma-
ceutical manufacturing firm, when it was served with an IRS summons issued
pursuant to the Service's investigatory powers.' 8 An independent audit of
Upjohn had found evidence that in January 1976 one of Upjohn's foreign subsid-
iaries had made payments to foreign officials in order to secure government busi-
ness. 19 The auditors reported to the corporation's general counsel, who discussed
the matter with the chairman of the board. Upjohn's attorneys sent question-
naires to all of Upjohn's overseas managers seeking information about any ques-
tionable payments which may have been made by Upjohn employees. A letter
from the chairman which accompanied the questionnaire noted that Gerald
Thomas, Upjohn's general counsel, had been asked "to conduct an investigation
for the purpose of determining the nature and magnitude of any payments made
by the Upjohn Company or any of its subsidiaries to any employee or official of a
foreign government. "20 Responses were sent directly to Thomas and he and
outside counsel interviewed the recipients of the questionnaire and thirty-three
other Upjohn employees.
In March 1976, Upjohn voluntarily filed a report with the Securities and
Exchange Commission disclosing the questionable payments. Upjohn also sent a
copy of the report to the IRS, which began investigating the tax consequences of
the payments. Upjohn officials gave special agents a list of the employees who
were interviewed and who had responded to the survey. In November 1976 the
IRS issued a summons demanding production of Thomas's files, including the
"written questionnaires sent to managers of the Upjohn Company's foreign affili-
ates, and memoranda or notes of interviews conducted in the United States and
abroad with officers and employees of the Upjohn Company and its subsidiar-
ies."'2 ' Claiming the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work-product
doctrine, the company refused to produce the documents.
The IRS sought enforcement of the summons in the United States District
12 Id
13 Id. at 686-88.
14 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Hickman created the work-product rule.
15 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2318. See also In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir.
1979).
16 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2292, at 554; Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege,
66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061 (1978); Simon, The Attorne-Clent Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J.
953 (1956).
17 329 U.S. at 510-11; FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
18 The Service acted pursuant to powers granted in I.R.C. § 7602.





Court for the Western District of Michigan. 22 The court adopted a magistrate's
opinion that the summons should be enforced 23 and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.24 The court found that the communicat-
ing employees were outside the "control group" of the corporation and hence
could not claim the corporate attorney-client privilege.25
I. The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege, one of the oldest in our legal tradition, 26 was
initially based upon the "oath and honor" of the attorney,2 7 but in the 1700's it
was entirely repudiated as an obstacle to the "judicial search for truth. '2 8 When
the privilege re-emerged in the early 1800's, it was considered a privilege of the
client and not the attorney.29 Wigmore describes the privilege as based on a
policy of promoting freedom of consultation between lawyer and client. 30 The
drafters of the Model Code of Evidence view the privilege as being justified on
the grounds of social policy.
3 1
The privilege has not gone without criticism, however. At least one com-
mentator has suggested that the continued vitality of the privilege is merely a
political concession to the bar.32 Another critic has suggested that as long as the
rule is argued by lawyers, for lawyers and to lawyers, a substantive reason for the
rule is unnecessary.
33
A. Application of the Privilege in the Corporate Setting
Although the attorney-client privilege was applied to attorneys dealing with
corporations at an early date, most of the applications were by inference.
34
Judge Wyzanski established an influential test for application of the privilege in
22 The action was brought pursuant to I.R.C. § 7402(b) and § 7604(a).
23 Upjohn Co. v. United States, No. K77-Misc. (W.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 1973).
24 600 F.2d 1223 (6th Cir. 1979).
25 Id at 1226-27. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider both the "control group" test and
the extent of the protection afforded by the attorney work-product rule in the enforcement of IRS sum-
monses. 445 U.S. 925 (1980).
26 See WIGMORE, supra note 3.
27 Id at 543.
28 Id
29 Id at 545.
30 Id
31 See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 210, comment (1942):
The continued existence of the privilege is justified on the grounds of social policy. In a society
as complicated in structure as ours and governed by laws as complex and detailed as those
imposed upon us, expert legal advice is essential. To the furnishing of such advice the fullest
freedom and honesty of communication of pertinent facts is a prerequisite. . . . The social
good derived from the proper performance of the functions of lawyers acting for their clients is
believed to outweigh the harm that may come from the suppression of evidence in specific cases.
32 Morgan, Foreword, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 28 (1942). See Radin, The Privilege of Confidential
Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487 (1928).
33 Weissenberger, supra note 2, at 899. Professor Radin more than a half-century ago criticized the
attorney-client privilege as an impediment to the search for truth. Radin, supra note 32, at 490.
34 See, e.g., United States v. Louisville & N. R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915). See also Schwimmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863-64 (8th Cir. 1956); Cole v. Hughes Tool Co., 215 F.2d 924, 930-31 (10th
Cir. 1954); Georgia-Pacific Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463, 464 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1954); &Eparte
Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 15, 77 N.E. 276, 279 (1905).
[Vol. 56:8871
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United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. ,35 where he presumed that the privilege
could be applied in a corporate situation. Judge Wyzanski also held that there
was no difference between in-house counsel and outside counsel for the purposes
of applying the privilege, and that the privilege could extend to all employees.: 6
Until Upjohn, the most important decision on the corporate attorney-client
privilege may have been one which was quickly overturned. Chief Judge Camp-
bell of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled
in Radiant Burners v. American Gas Association 3 7 (Radian Burners i) that the attorney-
client privilege does not apply to corporate clients. He found that the privilege,
like the privilege against self-incrimination, was fundamentally personal in na-
ture and therefore could not be claimed by a corporation, which he termed a
"mere creature of the state."3 8 The decision ended the judicial inclination to
assume that the privilege applied in the corporate setting and touched off a flurry
of commentary on the question. 3 9
Before Radiant Burners I was reviewed by the Seventh Circuit, another dis-
trict court, in Ciy of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. ,40 rejected Judge
Campbell's position. The court found that the attorney-client privilege does ap-
ply to a corporation, but only to those employees within the company's "control
group." The court defined that group as consisting of those persons "in a posi-
tion to control or even to take substantial part in a decision about any action
35 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). In his decision, Judge Wyzanski stated that the privilege applies
if:
(I) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client;
(2) the person to whom the communication was made
(a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and
(b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer;
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed
(a) by his client
(b) without the presence of strangers
(c) for the purpose of securing primarily either
(i) an opinion on law or
(ii) legal services or
(iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not
(d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and
(4) the privilege has been
(a) claimed and
(b) not waived by the client.
Id. at 358-59.
36 Id. at 360.
37 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Il. 1962), rev'd 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
38 Id at 773.
39 See, e.g., Austern, Corporate Counsel Communications. Is Anybody Listening?, 17 Bus. LAW. 868 (1962);
Gardner, A Personal Privilegefor C6omnnmications of Corporate Clients- Paradox or Public Polio?, 40 U. DET. L.J.
299 (1963); Gardner, A Re-evaluation ofthe Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 VILL. L. REv. 279 (1962); Haight,
Keeping the Privilege Inside the Corporation, 18 Bus. LAw. 551 (1963); Heininger, The Attorney-Client Privilege as
It Relates to Corporations, 53 ILL. B.J. 376 (1965); Jox, Attorney-Client Privilege-Its Apptication to a Corporate
Client, 3 WASHBURN L.J. 33 (1964); Schaefer, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Modern Business Corporation,
20 Bus. LAw. 989 (1965); Sedler and Simeone, The Realities ofAttorney-Client Confdences, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. I
(1963); Note, Attoney'-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 551 (1963); Note, The
Laziyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the Role of Ethics and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L.
REV. 235 (1961); Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege.- Does It Apply to Corporations?, 12 DE PAUL L. REv. 263
(1963); Comment, The Applicability ofthe Attorney-Client Privilege to a Corporation-The Current Evolution of an
Accepted Rule of Law, 17 MiAMI L. REV. 382 (1963); Comment, Applicability of/he Attorney-Client Privilege to
the Corporate Client, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 596 (1962).
40 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus andprohibiton deniedsub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick,
312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
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which the corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney. '41 These per-
sons were thought to personify the corporation and were therefore allowed to
claim the privilege.
42
Shortly after the City of Philadelphia decision, the Seventh Circuit reversed
the Radiant Burners I decision.43 The appellate court found that the attorney-
client privilege is a privilege of the client "without regard to the non-corporate
character of the client . . .44
In the wake of Radiant Burner I and City of Philadelphia, two additional tests
were developed.45 The Seventh Circuit, finding the "control group" test too
rigid, established the "subject matter" test in Harper &Row Publishers, Inc. v. Deck-
er.4 6 The court found an employee's communication privileged if a corporate
superior directed that the communication be made and if the subject matter was
within the duties of the employee.4 7 In Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith,48 the
Eighth Circuit created the "modified subject matter"49 or Weinstein test.5 0 This
test, a variation of the "subject matter" test, added the requirements that a supe-
rior must request the communication to secure legal advice and the communica-
tion may not be disseminated beyond those corporate personnel who need to
know its contents.
5'
The "control group" test was the test most frequently followed by the lower
courts.52 Some commentators praised it as the "bright line" test,53 but others
found it to be too inflexible. 54 Justice Rehnquist apparently was among the crit-
41 Id at 485.
42 Id
43 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
44 Id at 322.
45 See note 7 supra.
46 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1971), affd by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
47 Id at 491-92.
48 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
49 Id at 609.
50 2 J. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE I 503(b)[04] (1975).
51 572 F.2d at 609.
52 Weissenberger,supra note 2, at 909-10. Among the decisions accepting the "control group" test are:
In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Oil Co.), 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686
(10th Cir. 1968); Jarvis, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 84 F.R.D. 286 (D. Colo. 1979); In re Anthracite Coal Antitrust
Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 516 (M.D. Pa. 1979); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co., 68 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Va. 1975); United States v. IBM Corp., 66 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Honey-
well, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. GAF Corp.,
49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1969), afd, 478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F.
Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963). The "control group" test was adopted in the original draft of the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES rule 503 (1969). However, as the other tests were
developed, the drafters of the federal rules decided to make their proposal reflect the split in the courts and
dropped the "control group" test. Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, Rule
503, 56 F.R.D. 183, 235-40 (1973). In the end, Congress decided that privileges should be continued as
developed by common law. FED. R. EvID. 501.
53 Note, Attorng-Client Privilegefor Corporate Clients.- The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424, 430
(1970). The Third Circuit adopted that language in deciding In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d at
1235-37.
54 Kobak, supra note 2, at 351. See, e.g. , Brodsky, The "Zone of Darkness'" Special Counsel Investigations and
the Aaornq-Client Privilege, 8 SEC. REG. L.J. 123 (1980); Weinschel, Corporate Employees Interiews, 12 B.C.
IND. & COMM. L. REV. 873, 879 (1971); Note, The Corporate Attornug-Client Privilege in the Federal Courts, 22
CATH. LAW. 138, 146-47 (1976); Note, The Attorne-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting. A Suggested Ap-
proach, 69 MICH. L. REV. 360, 375 (1970); Comment, 47 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 413, 424-25 (1979); Com-
ment, Corporate Attornov-Client Privilege--Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith-The ModfedHarper &lRow
Test, 4J. CORP. LAW 226, 229-30 (1978); Comment, The Privileged Few: United States v. Upjohn-What Is
[Vol. 56:8871 891
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ics, for he rejected the test in deciding Upjohn. He wrote that "the narrow 'con-
trol group test' sanctioned by the Court of Appeals in this case cannot . . .
govern the development of the law in this area." 55 Justice Rehnquist reasoned
that the "control group" test overlooked the fact that the attorney-client privilege
protects not only professional advice given to corporate employees by counsel,
but also information given to counsel by employees so that counsel may give the
corporation "sound and informed advice."'56 In the corporate setting, he wrote,
many middle level employees may have information that the corporate attorney
should have. These employees may "embroil the corporation in serious legal dif-
ficulties" because they fail to make the attorney aware of the information they
possess. 57 The "control group" test frustrates the purpose of the privilege "by
discouraging the communication of relevant information by employees of the cli-
ent to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation." 58 Fi-
nally, Justice Rehnquist opined that the corporate attorney-client privilege must
be reasonably predictable to be effective, and that the disparate lower court opin-
ions revealed how unpredictable the "control group" standard is.
59
B. Did the Upjohn Court Accept the Weinstein Test?
In rejecting the "control group" test, the Upjhn Court did not announce
which test should be used to determine if the corporate attorney-client privilege
attached. 60 However, considerable similarities between the Upfhn and the Diver-
the Scope of the Attorne-Client Privilegefor a Corporation?, 25 S.D. L. REV. 415, 429 (1980); Comment, Privileged
Communica!ions-Inroads on the "Control Group" Test in the Corporate Area, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 759, 761
(1971).
55 101 S. Ct. at 686.
56 Id at 683.
57 Id
58 Id at 684.
59 Id Justice Rehnquist cited as evidence of this unpredictability Natta v. Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308, 315-
16 (N.D. Okla. 1967), aJ'd in part sub nom. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968), in which the
control group included managers and assistant managers of the corporation's patent division and research
and development departments, and Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 83-85 (E.D. Pa.
1969), af'd, 478 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1973), in which the control group included only division and corporate
vice-presidents and not two directors of research and the vice-president for production and research. 101
S. Ct. at 684.
Despite his criticism that the "control group" test leads to unpredictable results, Justice Rehnquist did
not articulate a standard which would be more predictable. It is on this point that ChiefJustice Burger, in
a brief concurring opinion, scored the majority stance. He contended that even though the Federal Rules
of Evidence call for a case-by-case determination of privilege, rule 501 also provides that the law of privi-
leges shall be governed by the principles of common law as interpreted by the courts of the United States.
Id at 689 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice argued that as a general rule a communication is
privileged when an employee or former employee speaks with an attorney at the direction of management
about matters within the scope of the employee's work. The attorney must be one authorized to inquire
into the subject and must be
seeking information to assist counsel in performing any of the following functions: (a) evaluat-
ing whether the employee's conduct has bound or would bind the corporation; (b) assessing the
legal consequences, if any, of that conduct; or (c) formulating appropriate legal responses to
actions that have been or may be taken by others with regard to that conduct.
Id Although the Chief Justice cited Diversified Industries, Harper &Row and Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1975), for his proposition, it appears that he has taken the
"modified subject matter" test and explained more fully which communications may be covered.
60 The Court noted that the parties and "various amici" suggested that the Court was deciding be-
tween which of two tests to apply, but responded that the Court decides "concrete cases and not abstract
propositions of law." Id at 681. The Court declined to lay down "a broad rule or series of rules to govern
all conceivable future questions in this area," id, on the ground that to do so would contravene the intent
of the Federal Rules of Evidence which seek a case-by-case application of privileges. Id at 686. The
Court's opinion is consistent with the route suggested by the petitioners, who proposed that the Court
June 198 1]
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sifted Industries cases in both fact and law may produce some guidelines for corpo-
rate counsel to follow when considering whether or not an intracorporate
communication is privileged.
In Diversified Industries, Weatherhead Corporation (Weatherhead) brought
suit in July 1975 alleging that employees of Diversified Industries (Diversified)
had bribed Weatherhead employees to purchase inferior copper from Diversified.
Weatherhead sought discovery of a report by a Washington, D.C. law firm which
Diversified had retained to investigate its business practices. Diversified resisted
discovery, relying on the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work-product
doctrine.6 ' The Eighth Circuit, using the Weinstein "modified subject matter"
test, found on rehearing that the law firm's report was privileged.62 The court
relied upon a familiar policy theme found in many of the decisions upholding the
corporate attorney-client privilege:
To be sure, there are possibilities of abuse, but the application of the attorney-client
privilege to this matter and others like it will encourage corporations to seek out and
correct wrong-doing in their own house and to do so with attorneys who are obli-
gated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to conduct the inquiry in an in-
dependent and ethical manner.
6 3
Factually, the only difference between Upjohn and Diversifed Industries is that in
the latter case outside counsel conducted the investigation,6 4 while in Upjohn the
company's general counsel, aided by outside counsel, conducted the investigation
and drafted the report.
65
Justice Rehnquist appears to have followed the "modified subject matter"
66
test. In holding that the privilege existed, he stated that the communications
(1) were made by Upjohn employees
(2) to counsel for Upjohn acting as such
(3) at the direction of corporate superiors
(4) in order to secure legal advice from counsel
(5) concerning matters within the scope of the employees' duties
(6) and were made by employees who "were sufficiently aware that they
were being questioned in order that the corporation could obtain legal advice."
'67
These criteria follow the model suggested by Judge Weinstein in Diversfiedlndus-
tries.6 8 The only significant difference between the "modified subject matter"
test and Justice Rehnquist's analysis is that the "modified subject matter" test
specifies that the information for which the privilege is sought must not be dis-
adopt a "more flexible approach" than the Weinstein approach, "perhaps awaiting further developments
in the lower courts." Petitioners' Reply Brief at 9.
61 572 F.2d at 599-601.
62 Id at 611. The appellate court agreed to rehear the case en banc after a three-judge panel had
denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. The panel had found that the communications were not
privileged and ordered them disclosed.
63 Id at 610.
64 Id at 599.
65 101 S. Ct. at 681.
66 2 J. WEINSrEIN, supra note 50.
67 101 S. Ct. at 685. This analysis of Upjohn was adopted by the district court in Baxter Travenol
Laboratories v. LeMay, No. C-3-80-362 (S.D. Ohio, Feb. 19, 1981). The court did not, however, see the
Supreme Court as having sanctioned the modified subject matter case. One commentator, however, has
contended that the Court did adopt the modified subject matter test. Feld, Supreme Court in Upjohn Protects
Attorney-Client Privilege; Upholds the Work-Product Doctrine, 54 J. OF TAX. 210 (1981).
68 572 F.2d at 609. The Court quotes favorably from Diversifed Industries at 101 S. Ct. at 683-84.
[Vol. 56:8871
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seminated beyond those who need to know it. While Justice Rehnquist does not
mention this in his analysis, unnecessary dissemination of material would consti-
tute a waiver of the privilege. Therefore, the fact that this element is not men-
tioned does not signify a departure from the "modified subject matter" test.69
C. The Implications of Upjohnfor the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege
Corporate counsel attempting to draw guidelines from Upjohn may take
comfort from the fact that the decision affords corporate counsel greater protec-
tion from discovery than did the "control group" test. 70 Because of the similarity
of Upjohn and Diversifed Industries, it appears safe for counsel to follow the "modi-
fied subject matter" test to determine when the attorney-client privilege will at-
tach in the corporate setting.
The key element of the Weinstein test is that the information communicated
to the corporate attorney by the employee must be within the scope of that per-
son's employment. Judge Weinstein used the example of an employee who saw
an accident involving corporate equipment while he was enroute to work. His
communication of that information to the corporate counsel would not be privi-
leged, since the information would not be related to the scope of the employee's
work. 71 If there were an accident involving equipment operated by the employee
while at work, that information could be privileged if communicated to counsel,
since it would be within the scope of the employee's employment. The impor-
tance of this element of the Weinstein test is that it prevents the "funneling" of
information to corporate counsel. Critics opposed to the use of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege in the corporate setting have worried about employees "funneling"
information to counsel in an effort to garner privileged status for such informa-
tion. 72 Judge Weinstein reasoned that the scope of employment requirement
would prevent such funneling.
73
As with all privilege questions, it is the communication that is privileged,
69 Judge Weinstein in his treatise on evidence stated that the one element of the attorney-client privi-
lege that is inherent in seeking the privilege is that there has been no waiver of it. Therefore, one element
of the privilege formulation "has always been that the communication must have been intended to be
confidential." 2 J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 50, at 503-43. See WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2311.
70 Former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold, who submitted an amicus brief in Upfhn for the Ameri-
can College of Trial Lawyers, sees the decision as having a wide-ranging effect on corporate relations.
Griswold said that the ruling could apply to situations such as the witnessing of an accident by a company
truck driver. If that employee has facts about an accident involving the company and communicates those
facts to the company attorney, Griswold said, "it would seem that what he says is now privileged." Compa-
nies WYn Broader Atlorney-Cl'ent Priltlege, Nat. Law J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 3. If the Court has accepted the
Weinstein test, then Dean Griswold and Judge Weinstein disagree as to the effect of the ruling since given
a simliar set of facts, Judge Weinstein has said that the privilege would not apply. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN,
supra note 50, at 503-04.
71 Id
72 See, e.g., Note, The Atlorne-Client Pr i'lege-dentiftyng the Corporate Client, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 1281,
1288 (1980).
73 The fear is that employers will instruct their employees to transmit information to the corporate
attorney, in effect "funnelling" information to the attorney so that the privilege would attach. See Note,
supra note 72, at 1298-99. The flaw in this argument is that the attorney-client privilege only protects the
communication to the attorney. It does not protect the information itself, which is still available from the
client. Of course, retrieving that information from the client is not nearly as convenient as raiding an
opposing attorney's files. The additional protection offered by the Weinstein test is that to garner the
privilege the information communicated must be within the employee's scope of employment and must be
communicated with the intent of receiving legal advice.
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not the facts. 74 The attorney cannot be compelled to disclose the communication
made to him, but the employee is still subject to questioning about the incident.
The "modified subject matter" test should thus prevent abuse of the privilege
while properly enlarging the zone of protection for communications by employ-
ees to corporate counsel. It will also protect corporations attempting to investi-
gate allegations of internal wrongdoing.
II. The Attorney Work-Product Doctrine
Cases factually similar to Upjohn should be argued primarily under attorney-
client privilege. If the corporate communicator can be identified as a client for
the purposes of the attorney-client privilege, then the protection afforded those
communications is absolute. 75 However, as in Upjohn, it may also be necessary to
argue the attorney work-product doctrine-the protection of which may not be
absolute.
The Sixth Circuit had surprised the parties in Upjohn by saying in a footnote
that the work-product doctrine did not apply to actions enforcing an IRS sum-
mons. 76 However, the Government elected not to argue in support of that find-
ing and in its brief acknowledged that the rule did apply to an IRS summons.
7 7
Justice Rehnquist noted that the Government was wise in conceding the point.
78
The Court remanded the case for review of Upjohn's contention that notes taken
by the firm's general counsel during interviews with its employees are protected
by the work-product doctrine.
79
The IRS had sought discovery of the questionnaires sent to Upjohn employ-
ees and the notes and memoranda of the general counsel's interviews with em-
ployees. Upjohn asserted the attorney-client privilege as a defense to the
discovery of the questionnaires, but asserted the work-product doctrine to block
discovery of the general counsel's notes and memoranda of interviews that went
beyond mere recording of responses. 80 Although the Supreme Court found that
74 See generaly Simon, The Atlorne,-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953, 954-55
(1956).
75 One commentator has suggested that before a court determines whether the attorney-client privi-
lege applies in an action to block the discovery of materials, it should decide whether the attorney work-
product doctrine offers protection. This was suggested because of the difficulty courts have in isolating the
corporate client for the purpose of attaching the attorney-client privilege. See Note, supra note 72. There
are two problems with this approach, however. First, the issue may be settled if the attorney-client rela-
tionship is established since the privilege is absolute. Second, if the communication is found to fall within
the work-product doctrine, the protection may not be absolute.
Two recent cases, factually similar to Diversi~,d Industries, have been decided under the work-product
doctrine. The Second Circuit, in deciding In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979), did
not determine if the attorney-client privilege applied because the materials involved in the action fit neatly
into the work-product doctrine. The court reversed a contempt finding issued by the lower court against
an attorney who refused to disclose the materials.
The Third Circuit, in In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979), decided that all of
the materials in issue (similar to those in Upjohn) were protected under the work-product doctrine except a
questionnaire completed by an employee who later died and notes of an interview with that person, con-
ducted by the attorney. Both cases offer courts alternatives when dealing with this type of case. However,
the rejection of the "control group" test in Upjohn should make such alternatives unnecessary, since it
should be easier now to include a corporate employee in the class of protected persons.
76 600 F.2d at 1228 n.13.
77 Respondent's Brief at 16.
78 101 S. Ct. at 686.
79 Id. at 689.
80 Id. at 686.
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the magistrate who originally considered the case applied the wrong standard in
resolving the work-product issue,81 it did not specify which standard should be
applied. Therein lies the second unanswered question of Upjohn.
A. Hickman v. Taylor
The work-product doctrine, first stated by the Supreme Court in Hickman v.
Taylor82 and later adopted in rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure,8 3 is one of the critical standards of American law governing pretrial discov-
ery.84 The doctrine protects from discovery the products of an attorney which
are prepared in anticipation of litigation. 85 However, two questions about the
rule remain unanswered: (1) whether the protection is qualified or absolute, and
(2) if it is qualified, what burden of proof the party seeking discovery must sus-
tain in order to overcome the protection afforded by the doctrine.
The court of appeals in Hickman categorized the work in question as "the
work product of the lawyer,"'86 an expression which the Supreme Court ac-
cepted. 87 Another court has since defined work product as "the tangible and
intangible material which reflects an attorney's efforts at investigating and pre-
paring a case, including one's pattern of investigation, assembling of information,
determination of relevant facts, preparation of legal theories, planning of strategy
and recording of mental impressions."88 There has been little question that the
rule applies to attorneys working for corporations. 89
81 Id at 688.
82 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
83 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) states:
Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule, a party
may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivi-
sion (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another
party or by or for that other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substan-
tial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering
discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attor-
ney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
84 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2022, at 183 (1970).
85 329 U.S. at 510-11. See Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d at 603; Handgards, Inc. v.
Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929-30 (N.D. Cal. 1976); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 84,
§§ 2017, 2021-28.
86 153 F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 1945).
87 329 U.S. at 511.
88 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 8, 1979, 622 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1979).
89 In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840, 842 (8th Cir. 1973). The obvious limitation is
that the attorney must be performing actual legal work, not simply working as an accountant, a tax
preparer or a businessman. See United States v. Vehicular Parking Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751 (D. Del. 1943);
Maurer, Privileged Communications and the Corporate Counsel, 28 ALA. LAw. 352, 372 (1967); Simon, supra note
74, at 973-74.
Agency theory has also been offered as a justification for applying the attorney-client privilege to
corporations, Note, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the Role of Ethics and Is Possible
Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 235, 241 (1965), and the argument can logically be extended to the work-
product doctrine and its application to corporate relations. An employee can work as an agent of a corpo-
ration. If an attorney works with that agent in preparing materials anticipatory of litigation, the attorney
can obviously claim the work-product doctrine protection. The safeguard in this system is that the materi-




1. An Absolute or Qualified Protection?
Despite the firm legal basis for the work-product doctrine, some dispute re-
mains as to the extent of the doctrine's protection. 90 The doctrine is the product
of a clash between the desire for broad and liberal discovery and the concern for
protecting the privacy of lawyers preparing for litigation.9 ' Wigmore noted that
all privileges must be narrowly construed, 92 but the work-product doctrine has
been, at times, broadly applied.
93
Hickman established the initial boundaries of the work-product doctrine. In
that case the discovering party sought statements from the defendant company's
attorney, who had prepared memoranda following an interview with the four
surviving crew members of a sunken tug boat. The district court found the attor-
ney in contempt when he refused to produce the subpoenaed materials. The
court of appeals reversed the lower court's decision, holding that such material
was fully privileged. 94 The Supreme Court affirmed, but on different grounds.
The Court deemed the interrogatories to be "simply an attempt, without pur-
ported necessity or justification" 95 to acquire materials prepared by the opposing
attorney. The Court said the attorney's memoranda fell outside of "the arena of
discovery."'96 The Court noted that although attorneys are officers of the court
and are bound to work for the advancement of justice,9 7 they must be able to
work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion.98 Proper
preparation of a case demands that an attorney "assemble information, sift what
he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories
and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference." 99 The Court
noted that if the "interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs,
mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangi-
ble[s]''t ° were open to discovery, they would likely go unwritten and justice
would suffer.' 0 ' The Court added that it did not mean that all written materials
prepared by counsel with "an eye toward litigation are necessarily free from dis-
covery in all cases."' 0 2 The burden rests on the party invading the attorney's files
to show adequate reason. '
03
The Court distinguished written statements produced by the attorney and
oral statements made to him during interviews. Discovery of the written materi-
als required a showing of necessity, but discovery of the oral statements required
90 Compare In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 473 F.2d at 848, and In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis),
412 F. Supp. 943, 949 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (absolute protection under the work-product doctrine), with In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 8, 1979, 622 F.2d at 936, and In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d at
1231 (protection not absolute).
91 Note, Protection of Opinion Work Product Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 VA. L. REV. 333,
334-37 (1978).
92 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2292, at 554.
93 Se, e.g. , In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943 (conferring absolute protection
on all opinion work product).
94 329 U.S. at 498-500.
95 Id at 510.
96 Id
97 Id
98 Id at 510-11.
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something more. The Court noted that in Hickman no showing could be made
which would justify production of the oral statements, 10 4 and added that it
would be a "rare situation"'10 5 which justified such discovery.
The Court appeared to be acknowledging a different standard of discovery
for written memoranda than for the attorney's mental impressions and recollec-
tions. That difference was adopted in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 26(b)(3) states:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable
under subdivision (b) (1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation. . . by
or for another party . . . only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials in preparation of his case and that he is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the material by other
means.
10 6
The rule adds that in ordering discovery upon the making of the required show-
ing, "the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclu-
sions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
concerning the litigation."'
10 7
The two sentences of the rule are complementary. 0 8 The first instructs the
court as to what standard is required for the discovery of documents and tangible
things. The second instructs that in the discovery of tangible things and docu-
ments, the court must protect against the discovery of mental impressions. There
is thus a distinction between tangible documents and what has been called the
"opinion work product" of an attorney. 0 9
2. A Higher Burden of Proof for Discovery of Opinion Work-Product
There appears, then, to be a hierarchy of privileges against discovery. The
Supreme Court selected the middle ground in Hickman, after both the district
court and the appellate court chose the extreme positions. The ensuing commen-
tariest 0 and the resulting case law' 1 ' point to a pattern which may be useful in
determining how the attorney work-product doctrine is to be applied.
The attorney-client privilege, which developed independently of the work-
product doctrine," 2 is the strongest of these exceptions to discovery since it is
absolute. Next, there appears to be a category for the attorney opinion work
product.'i3 Courts have found that this work product is either immune from
104 Id
105 Id at 513.
106 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (emphasis added).
107 Id
108 See Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1974).
109 Id; see geeal(y Note, supra note 9 1. One commentator has explained that "the Court also drew a
distinction. . . by which so much of the work product as may reflect the mental impressions or opinions of
the lawyer was, for practical purposes, absolutely immune from discovery." C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 84, § 2022, at 188.
110 See, e.g., Note, supra note 91.
111 See, e.g., cases cited in note 90 supra; United States v. Gates, 35 F.R.D. 524, 526 (D. Colo. 1964).
112 In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 473 F.2d at 844. The attorney-client privilege obviously greatly pre-
dates the attorney work-product doctrine, which was not formally accepted until 1947. However, the two
rules, despite being independent in development, are complementary in the protection they offer an attor-
ney working in anticipation of litigation. But cf. Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson &Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926,
929-30 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (policies and purposes of the work-product doctrine differ from those underlying
the attorney-client privilege).
113 See, e.g., 509 F.2d at 732; In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977).
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discovery' 1 4 or virtually immune, granting discovery only when the material is
evidence of a crime or when the material requested is "at issue." 1 1 5 Finally, there
are tangible documents produced by the lawyer in anticipation of litigation. If
they do not contain a lawyer's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal
theories, these materials "are discoverable by an adversary party upon a showing
of substantial need and undue hardship." 
1 16
A number of courts have apparently endorsed the concept of a hierarchy of
privileges 1 7 by granting greater protection to work done by an attorney in prep-
114 See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1974).
115 In re Murphy, 560 F.2d at 337 n.19 (attorney's file contains inculpatory evidence of attorney's own
illegal activities); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979) (corporate
attorney's papers may disclose whether the company he represented made false statements during an ini-
tial grand jury investigation).
116 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504, 512 (2d Cir. 1979); In re
Natta, 410 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir. 1969); Barr Marine Products Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631,
633-34 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Jarvis, Inc. v. AT&T Co., 84 F.R.D. 286, 293 (D. Colo. 1979).
117 In In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979), the Second Circuit said that production
of information might be justified where witnesses are no longer available or can be reached only with
difficulty. The court limited its holding to written statements, saying that "the same is not true for oral
statements made by witnesses to the attorney." Id at 512. As a result, the court found that all of the
materials sought in this case were the work product of the attorneys and that a showing of necessity "in
differing degrees" was necessary to secure their discovery. Id The court found the level of necessity of-
fered by the Government to be insufficient to compel discovery, particularly in light of the otherwise high
level of cooperation shown by the company being investigated.
The Sixth Circuit, in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 8, 1979, 622 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1979),
also found that memoranda sought by an opponent may be discovered only in rare and extraordinary
circumstances. Id at 936.
The Fourth Circuit in Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730 (4th Cir.
1974), determined that during litigation the opinion work product of an attorney enjoyed an absolute
privilege against discovery. The court stated that the absolute privilege becomes qualified once the litiga-
tion is terminated and the material is sought in a subsequent action. Id at 733.
The Eighth Circuit also adopted the absolute immunity standard for an attorney as to his personal
recollections, notes or memoranda from interviews, In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840,
848 (8th Cir. 1973), as did the district court in In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943
(E.D. Pa. 1976). The district court found that an attorney's notes from an interview with a witness were
"in the pure Hidman category." Id at 949. The court said that such notes "are so much a product of the
lawyer's thinking and so little probative of the witnesses' actual words that they are absolutely protected
from disclosure." Id The court also noted that memoranda of law and notes used in preparing them,
made in anticipation of litigation, are also clearly protected by the work-product doctrine. Id
The Eighth Circuit reconsidered its position in In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1977), and
concluded again that opinion work product is virtually undiscoverable:
It is clear that opinion work product is entitled to substantially greater protection than ordinary
work product. Therefore, unlike ordinary work product, opinion work product can not be dis-
covered upon a showing of substantial need and an inability to secure the substantial equivalent
of the material by alternative means without undue hardship. . . . In our view, opinion work
product enjoys a nearly absolute immunity and can be discovered only in very rare and extra-
ordinary circumstances. . . . Our unwillingness to recognize an absolute immunity for opinion
work product stems from the concern that there may be rare situations, yet unencountered by
this court, where weighty considerations of public policy and a proper administration of justice
would militate against the non-discovery of an attorney's mental impressions.
Id at 336. The court went on to find that opinion work product may not be immune if it contains
inculpatory material of illegal activities by the attorney. The court noted'that this was an "unresolved
question" in many circuits, but said that its holding constituted a logical extension of the attorney-client
privilege. Id at 337. Since the attorney work-product doctrine is broader than the attorney-client privi-
lege, though, traditional exceptions to the privilege cannot be "automatically engrafted" onto the work-
product doctrine. Id Nonetheless, the court found that the inculpatory material exception might apply to
the work-product doctrine, though it declined to apply it here.
See also Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson &Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (work-product
doctrine offers virtual immunity, the exception being when the attorney's actions are "at issue"); Truck
Ins. Exch. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 66 F.R.D. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Bud v. Penn Cent. Co., 61
F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 979 (E.D.
Wis. 1969). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin refined the position it
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aration for litigation which may reveal an attorney's mental impressions and
strategies. Despite favorable mention by commentators and the courts, accept-
ance of the opinion work-product theory is not widespread. Many courts con-
tinue to view attorney work product as a one-dimensional doctrine blocking
discovery unless substantial need or undue hardship can be shown. However, the
language and history of Hickman and the language of rule 26(b)(3) clearly indi-
cate an intent to differentiate between the ordinary attorney work product and
opinion work product. Under this theory, an attorney's opinion work product
would be much less available than such materials as verbatim statements taken
from witnesses in preparation for trial. An attorney preparing for litigation
should know that unless the materials he prepares are "at issue" in the contro-
versy or contain inculpatory information, they will be protected from discovery.
As Justice Jackson stated in his concurring opinion in Hickman, "Discovery was
hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions either
without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary."' 1 8
The Supreme Court in Upjohn acknowledged the distinction between ordi-
nary and opinion work product. The Court noted that rule 26 "accords special
protection to work product revealing the attorney's mental processes." ' 19 Using
much the same analysis as the Fourth Circuit employed in Duplan Corp. . Moulin-
age et Relorderie de Chavanoz,120 the Court said that the Hickman decision had
"stressed the danger that compelled disclosure of such memoranda would reveal
the attorney's mental processes. '"21 While acknowledging that some courts
found an absolute immunity for work product based upon oral statements from
witnesses,' 2 2 the Court refused to rule on this issue. Instead, it found that the
magistrate in Upjohn used the wrong standard when he applied the "substantial
need" and "undue hardship" test.1 23 The Court concluded that the notes and
memoranda sought revealed the attorneys' mental processes in evaluating the
communications, and declared: "As Rule 26 and Hickman make clear, such work
product cannot be disclosed simply on a showing of substantial need and inabil-
ity to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship."
1 24
After seemingly embracing the absolute or virtually absolute immunity stan-
dard for opinion work product, the Upjohn Court did not rule that such material
is always protected by the work-product doctrine.1 25 Instead, the Court noted
that a "far stronger" showing of necessity and unavailability by other means than
was made would be necessary to compel disclosure.
2 6
took in Keame & Trecker when it ruled 10 years later that interview memoranda are virtually immune
from discovery. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979, 478 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Wis. 1979). The
court would not, however, sanction the "at issue" or evidence of a crime exceptions to the doctrine. Id at
375.
One commentator defended the use of these two exceptions on the ground that they "further the
ultimate goal of the judicial system of eliciting truth and justice." See Note, supra note 91, at 343.
118 329 U.S. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring).
119 101 S. Ct. at 688.
120 509 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1974).





126 Id at 688-89. The Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the Government could
show a degree of necessity for production of the materials which was higher than the substantial need
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The position taken by the Supreme Court leaves three alternatives for the
Sixth Circuit. First, it could embrace the absolute immunity standard for attor-
ney opinion work product. Second, it could establish the "virtually immune"
standard, allowing discovery of opinion work product only when the attorney's
information is "at issue" or is material evidence of a crime or'fraud. Finally, the
court could establish an "intermediate level" of scrutiny between the undue
hardship/substantial need standard and the virtually immune standard.
The absolute immunity standard is unappealing because it does not deal
with the situation in which the attorney's work product materials are at issue.
The "virtually immune" standard offers nearly as much protection as the abso-
lute standard while allowing two narrow, necessary exceptions. Hickman and rule
26(b)(3) clearly show an intent to offer special protection for the opinion work
product of attorneys. However, to make such work product absolutely immune
from discovery even when the material could be evidence of a crime would be
undesirable. Thus, the virtually immune standard offers the greatest protection
for attorney work product while not allowing the privilege to hide evidence of a
crime. The "intermediate level" of scrutiny is unappealing since it would only
further fractionalize an area of the law already susceptible to confusion.
III. Conclusion
The Upjohn case will be viewed as a landmark decision in the law of evi-
dence and corporations. It reaffirms that corporations can, in fact, be clients for
the purpose of the attorney-client privilege. The Supreme Court wisely rejected
the restrictive "control group" test, which in its rigidity failed to take into ac-
count the need for flexible communications within corporations. 27 While the
Court appears to have followed the "modified subject matter" test, it refused to
specify which test is to be followed in the future. This is unfortunate, since a
definitive test would have given corporate counsel guidance in managing the le-
gal affairs of their companies. Nonetheless, because of the great similarity in the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Upjohn and the Eighth Circuit in Diversified
Industries, it appears that the Court has sanctioned the Weinstein test by infer-
ence.
As to the attorney work-product doctrine, there is now no question that it
can afford protection from an IRS summons. However, the Court declined to
create a special category of protection for the opinion work product of an attor-
ney, instead remanding that issue to the Sixth Circuit for reconsideration. This
failure to indicate the standard applicable to opinion work-product is unfortu-
nate. On rehearing the appellate court should adopt the "virtually immune"
standard, finding that the memoranda and notes which the IRS seeks from
Upjohn constitute the opinion work product of Upjohn's attorneys and conse-
standard used by the magistrate. Justice Rehnquist's choice of words shows that while the Court is reluc-
tant to adopt the absolute immunity standard, it envisions a standard higher than the substantial
need/undue hardship standard. Thus, the Court may prefer the "virtual immunity" standard for material
that can be categorized as opinion work product. Id
127 See Weissenberger, supra note 2, at 905; Comment, 47 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 413, 424 (1979).
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quently are immune from discovery unless shown to be at issue in the case or to
contain evidence of crime.
Gerald F Lulkus
